Abrahamson, Eric
Fombrun, Charles J.
1994
Macrocultures: Determinants and Consequences

742
“Proposition 4: The greater the homogeneity of a macroculture’s beliefs about boundaries, the less likely are any top managers to react to threats or opportunities from organizations outside these boundaries.”

743
“Proposition 5: The greater the homogeneity of a macroculture’s beliefs about reputations, the less likely are top managers to initiate rivalry-creating changes.”

“Proposition 6: The greater the homogeneity of a macroculture’s beliefs about strategic issues, (a) the less likely are top managers to notice and attend to information about new strategic issues and (b) the less likely they are to initiate change in reaction to these issues

744
“Proposition 7: The greater the homogeneity of a macroculture’s beliefs about boundaries, the lower the rate of introduction of innovations invented by organizations outside the boundaries.”

745
“Proposition 10: The greater the homogeneity of a macroculture’s beliefs about strategic issues, the higher the rate of competence-enhancing innovation and the lower the rate of competence-destroying innovation.”

“Proposition 11: The greater the homogeneity of a macroculture’s beliefs about strategic issues, the more rapid and complete the diffusion of competence-enhancing innovations and the less rapid and complete the diffusion of competence-destroying innovations.”
-> Hollywood managed to introduce 3D cinemas all over the world in a fairly short time (once they decided on a standard, which took forever).

746
“Proposition 12: The greater the homogeneity of a macroculture’s beliefs about boundaries, the lower the variety in member organizations’ competitive strategies.”

“Proposition 13: The greater the homogeneity of a macroculture’s beliefs about reputations, the more stable the strategic group structure of the collectivity.”

“Proposition 14: The greater the homogeneity of a macroculture’s beliefs about strategic issues, the lower the variety in member organizations competitive strategies and the fewer the number of strategic groups.”

750
“organizations bound by homogeneous macrocultures may underperform for a number of reasons already advanced in our propositions: their inability to recognize new types of competitors or symbionts, notice new strategic issues, or initiate change.”

“Greater macrocultural homogeneity, in turn, may cause (a) severance of value-added network ties with organizations on the periphery of these macrocultures and (b) proliferation of value-added ties with organizations within the macroculture. Repeated cycles of such a feedback loop might lead to increasingly dense value-added networks and increasingly homogeneous macrocultures. A spiraling process of this sort would leave organizations within its grip increasingly vulnerable to exogenous changes in the structure of value-added networks and, thus, limit collective adaptation. It may well illuminate the deteriorating position of the United States in industries like auto and steel throughout the 1970s and 1980s.”